Has anyone here even read a viability plan yet?

[the Teuton]

Because, seriously, this stuff sounds worse than the bullshit I cobbled together in some of my business classes. 

http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/eesa/agreements/auto-reports/GMRestructuringPlan.pdf

They need 12-13 million cars sold in the US to meet break-even, and that's assuming that all of the other money losers like Saab are gone.

This is really glorified hogwash.

[the Teuton]

Interesting, GM lists three bankruptcy plans on pages 104 and 105.

1. ―Pre-solicited or Pre-packaged Chapter 11‖ -- Under this scenario, and as
contemplated in the Company?s planned Bond/VEBA exchange offer, tendering
bondholders would be required to vote affirmatively to accept a Chapter 11 Plan of
Reorganization. If possible (because the Plan of Reorganization received the requisite
votes) and necessary (because the out of court process failed), the exchange plan would
be implemented in bankruptcy, binding 100% of the bondholders to accept consideration
equivalent to that contemplated in the out of court exchange. However, this scenario
requires an agreement in advance regarding the treatment of VEBA liabilities acceptable
to bondholders, as well as a commitment for government financing. No other creditor
would be impaired. Existing shareholders would be almost entirely diluted.
This scenario is assumed to require approximately 60-65 days to achieve confirmation of
the plan and exit from Chapter 11. It will cause a quite severe near-term negative revenue
impact during the bankruptcy proceeding, and a less severe but still serious long-term
negative revenue impact after exiting from Chapter 11.
2. ―Pre-negotiated Cram-Down Plan‖ -- Under this option, which is more
aggressive than a consensual pre-packaged Chapter 11 approach discussed in Scenario 1
above, the Company would seek a larger conversion of debt to equity. This strategy
could take many forms, including: (A) complete conversion of the bonds to equity; (B)
reduction in obligations from impairing additional classes of claims (including potentially
litigation liabilities, dealer claims and contract rejection damages); and (C) greater to
perhaps complete equitization of the VEBA obligations. This scenario is assumed to
require a minimum of 90 days for its least aggressive variant, up to as long as six months
or more for more aggressive variants, such as converting a portion of other liabilities to
equity. If the Company were to pursue a larger or complete conversion of the VEBA to
104
equity, the assumption is that this would be a vigorously contested, endangering
resolution with the UAW and potentially forcing the Company into an extended
traditional Chapter 11 case or free-fall bankruptcy as described in Scenario 3.
For analytical purposes, GM has assumed only the benefits in (A) above, or conversion of
the bonds to equity, completed in the shortest (90 day) timeframe possible. The negative
revenue impact during this option is expected to be even more severe, with greater
permanent effects, compared to the pre-solicited process described in Scenario 1. In
addition, the cram down process results in an incremental $4 billion debt reduction, or
complete conversion of all U.S. unsecured debt to equity, but also involves significantly
higher levels of DIP financing required which, in turn, produces a significantly negative
NPV. There would be significantly less negative impact than in a traditional Chapter 11,
which has broader implications for the industry as a whole. However, this scenario
includes elements likely to elicit opposition, which increases the timing risks and the risk
that Scenario 2 might evolve into the substantially less favorable Scenario 3.
3. ―Traditional Chapter 11 Case‖ -- Under this scenario, the objective would be
to accomplish a more comprehensive restructuring of the liability portion of the balance
sheet, along with substantial asset dispositions, using all of the tools traditionally
available to debtors to restructure through a court supervised process.
This process could be expected to require 18-24 months, with an estimated 24 months
used for analytical purposes in this appendix. Financially, while the traditional
bankruptcy process allows for greater liability reduction potential, incremental funding
requirements surge close to a $100 billion or more, reflecting catastrophic revenue
reduction impact as well as wholesale (i.e., dealer) financing requirements and supplier
support. The revenue impact during this type of bankruptcy would be very severe, with a
substantially delayed recovery time and significant potential for permanent, significant
damage. Indeed, there is considerable doubt whether the Company would survive this
process.

[Submariner]

Wait...wait...you're expecting people in Washington to have read it, let alone understand it?

Ha...hahahaha good one

[omicron]

Australia?Continued local production has become more challenging due
to changes in market preferences. GM?s local subsidiary (Holden) and
the Australian government have developed a plan to bring to market a new,
more fuel-efficient vehicle, with project funding provided by the
Australian Government in the form of permanent grants. With this
support, Holden is projected to be a viable operation, making a positive
NPV contribution.

[Nethead]

omi for the win!!!!!!!!!!   

[Xer0]

Wait...wait...you're expecting people in Washington to have read it, let alone understand it?

Ha...hahahaha good one

[dazzleman]

The aUstralia section mentions government support also..

Don't you see, the 'viability plan' is simply to suck at the tit of the taxpayer for as long as possible.  What's $20 or $30 billion every couple of months?  We can't abandon this industry that we invented.....

[the Teuton]

So it should be called "Let's go down with the Titanic?"